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(WSNs): Security and Privacy
Issues and Solutions
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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become one of the current research
areas, and it proves to be a very supportive technology for various applications such
as environmental-, military-, health-, home-, and office-based applications. WSN
can either be mobile wireless sensor network (MWSN) or static wireless sensor
network (SWSN). MWSN is a specialized wireless network consisting of consider-
able number of mobile sensors, however the instability of its topology introduces
several performance issues during data routing. SWSNs consisting of static nodes
with static topology also share some of the security challenges of MWSNs due to
some constraints associated with the sensor nodes. Security, privacy, computation
and energy constraints, and reliability issues are the major challenges facing WSNs,
especially during routing. To solve these challenges, WSN routing protocols must
ensure confidentiality, integrity, privacy preservation, and reliability in the net-
work. Thus, efficient and energy-aware countermeasures have to be designed to
prevent intrusion in the network. In this chapter, we describe different forms of
WSNs, challenges, solutions, and a point-to-point multi-hop-based secure solution
for effective routing in WSNs.
Keywords: wireless sensor network, encryption, routing protocol, security, privacy
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN), as shown in Figure 1, is a wireless
interconnected network which consists of independently setup devices that monitor
the conditions of its environment using sensors. WSNs are employed in a wide
range of applications such as security surveillance, environmental monitoring, tar-
get tracking, military defense, intrusion detection, etc. Security in wireless sensor
network is at a growing stage mainly not because of nonavailability of efficient
security schemes, but most of the existing schemes are not suitable due to the
peculiarity of WSNs. That is, WSNs’ nodes have low computational capacity and
energy constraint. In WSNs, sensor nodes have the ability to communicate with one
another, but their primary task is to sense, gather, and compute data. These data are
forwarded, via multiple hops, to a sink which may use it or relay it to other
networks. To achieve an effective communication, WSNs need efficient routing
protocols [2–6]. They facilitate communication in WSNs by discovering the appro-
priate routes for transmitting data and maintain the routes for subsequent
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transmissions. As a result of heterogeneity of WSNs’ nodes, different protocols had
been developed for different WSNs depending on the nature of the nodes and
application. For instance, there are dedicated protocols for MWSNs and dedicated
protocols for SWSNs.
There are two modes of transmission in WSN; single hop involves the source
node sending its data packets to the destination within a hop. Meanwhile, WSNs’
sensor nodes may rely on one another in order to relay packets to remote destina-
tions. This mode of transmission is called multi-hop. Multi-hop is a routing phe-
nomenon that involves the transfer of data between source and destination nodes
with the cooperation of intermediary nodes. It enhances the performance of WSNs
by allowing energy-depleted node to transfer data through its neighboring nodes
along the routing path to the destination node. There are several security and
privacy issues associated with multi-hop routing. Some of these issues like
snooping, sinkhole, tampering Sybil, clone, wormhole, spoofing, etc. affect the
integrity, availability, and data confidentiality of the WSNs.
Several security solutions had been proposed for WSNs; however, resource
constraint of sensors makes some of these security solutions unfit for WSNs. This,
therefore, makes their adoption in WSNs impossible. This is as a result of instability
of the topology of most WSNs. Some of the WSNs, unlike some other networks,
consist of mobile nodes that intermittently change the topology of the networks,
therefore making it impossible for such mobile network to use existing protocol
developed for static nodes. Also, large volume of data is transferred on the WSNs;
this increases the traffic on the wireless communication infrastructure of WSN. All
these show that security and privacy solutions of WSNmust not only be lightweight
in terms of the computational, communication, and energy overheads but also
support aggregation and multi-hop in order to reduce the traffics and extend the life
span of the networks. Meanwhile, most of the existing security solutions do not
have these performance requirements [1, 7–10].
2. Classification of WSNs protocols
Routing protocols can be classified into:
1.Data-centric routing protocol
2.Hierarchical routing protocol
Figure 1.
A typical wireless sensor networks (WSN) [1].
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3.Multipath-based routing protocol
4.Location-based routing protocol
5.QoS-based routing protocol
6.Mobility-based routing protocol
2.1 Data-centric routing protocol
Data-centric routing protocol combines data arriving from various sensor nodes
at a specific route. This eliminates redundancies and minimizes the total amount
of data transmission before forwarding it to the base station. Directed diffusion,
rumor routing, and sensor protocol for information via negotiation (SPIN) protocol
are examples of data-centric routing protocol [11, 12].
SPIN is a negotiation-based data-centric protocol for WSNs. Each node uses
metadata to name its data, and negotiation is performed by a sensor node using its
metadata. Hence, each node is able to negotiate whether to deliver data or not, in
order to eliminate redundant data transmission throughout the network. After the
negotiation, the sender transmits its data as shown in Figure 2; node A starts by
broadcasting its hop request to its neighboring node B. Once the request is accepted,
node A sends its data to B who then repeats this procedure. This is to find its
neighboring node and hops the data to the neighboring node until the data reaches
the destination. SPIN protocol saves energy due to the fact that each node only
performs single hop. SPIN’s hop request and acceptance packets prevent flooding
attack onWSNs. Although SPIN protocol is good for lossless networks, it can also be
used for lossy or mobile networks.
2.2 Hierarchical routing protocol
Hierarchical routing protocol classifies network nodes into hierarchical clusters.
For each of the clusters, the protocol selects a node with high residual energy as the
cluster head. The sensed data of each node in the cluster are transferred through the
cluster heads of the clusters in the network [11]. The cluster node aggregates the
sensed data of all the nodes in the cluster before sending it to the sink. Hierarchical
routing protocol reduces the energy consumption through multi-hop transmission
mode [13]. Also, data aggregation performed by the cluster head reduces traffic on
Figure 2.
SPIN protocol.
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the network. Low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH), threshold-
sensitive energy-efficient sensor network protocol (TEEN) and adaptive
threshold-sensitive energy-efficient sensor network protocol (APTEEN), and
secure hierarchical energy-efficient routing (SHEER) are examples of hierarchical
routing protocol. TEEN gives a very good performance since it reduces the number
of transmissions [14]. Patil et al. presented SHEER in [15]. It uses adaptive proba-
bilistic transmission mechanism for determining the optimal route in WSN. SHEER
also adopts hierarchical key establishment scheme (HIKES) for key distribution,
authentication, and confidentiality. SHEER involves four phases as described below:
2.2.1 Initiation phase
1.The base station (BS), computes key KR ¼ HMAC IRkORð Þ, generates a
broadcast authentication token NR, and encrypts it as N
l
R ¼ EncKR NRð Þ. The
base station pre-loads each sensor node with NlR and keeps IR and OR.
2.BS broadcasts the initiation call as Nb k IR k OR k EncKR init k Nb k NR kN
00
R
 
,
where init is the initiation call, OR is the index, OR is the offset of KR, and Nb is
time stamp generated by BS.
3.On receiving the initiation message, the sensor node extracts and decrypts
EncKR init k Nb k NR kN
00
R
 
, regenerates N0R, and compares it with the NR in
the received initiation message. If they are similar, then the base station is
successfully authenticated. It then replaces NR in the newly with N0R, sets its
timer and starts the next phase.
2.2.2 Neighbor discovery phase
During the neighbor discovery phase, the sensor nodes establish their hopping
link with their neighboring node. Each node switches from listening mode to trans-
mission mode. In listening mode, node sends a HELLO message containing its
identity, a nonce, and an encrypted header with the sensor key until it gets a reply
from its neighboring nodes.
2.2.3 Clustering phase
In this phase, cluster consisting of certain number of nodes with a cluster head is
selected based on some parameters.
2.2.4 Data message exchange phase
Each sensor sends its data to the base station through the cluster heads. This
centralize data transmission reduces collision within clusters.
2.3 Multipath routing protocol
For an effective data delivery, multipath routing protocol generates a multipath
(primary and secondary paths) from the source node to the destination node. It uses
secondary path in case the primary path fails. With this, fault tolerance is achieved.
However, this increases the cost of routing through the cost of maintaining multiple
paths between source and destination [10, 16]. There are different types of
multipath-based routing protocols.
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2.3.1 Disjoint path routing protocol
In a disjoint path routing protocol, every source node finds the shortest dis-
jointed multipath to the sink node. It evenly shares its data load among these
disjointed paths. All the paths in this multipath share no sensor node. The protocol
is reliable with extra overhead but at a low energy.
2.3.2 Braided path routing protocol
To construct braided multipath, the protocol first selects the primary path; then
for every sensor, the best path is chosen from source to sink node, but this path does
not include the primary node. The best alternative paths that are not necessarily
disjoint from the primary path are called idealized braided multipath. These alter-
native paths are located either on the primary path or very close to it which means
that the energy consumption on both the primary path and an alternative path is
almost equal [17].
2.3.3 N to 1 multipath discovery routing protocol
N to 1 multipath discovery protocol is a protocol based on flooding. Example of
N to 1 multipath-based routing protocol is multipath-based segment-by-segment
routing (MSSR) protocol proposed by Lu et al. in [18]. MSSR protocol divides a
single path into multiple segments, where multiple node-disjoint paths are discov-
ered and independently maintained. N to 1 multipath discovery routing protocol
reduces congestion, and effectively manages.
2.4 Location-based routing protocol
Location-based routing protocol routes data based on the distance of the source
and destination nodes. It calculates the distance between source and destination
nodes in order to determine estimated routing energy. Shruti [19] proposed a
location-based routing protocol. The protocol uses the signal strength of the incom-
ing signal to determine their distance. In their protocol, all the non-active nodes are
put in sleeping mode in order to save energy. In location-based, the knowledge of
the position of sensor nodes is exploited to route the query from the base station to
the event. Location information enables the network to select the best route.
Another example of the location-based protocol is the geographic adaptive
fidelity (GAF) protocol for mobile adhoc networks (MANETs). GAF conserves
energy, and reduces routing overhead, which makes suitable for WSNs. Other
examples of location-based protocols are location-aided routing (LAR), energy-
efficient location-aided routing (EELAR), greedy location-aided routing protocol
(GLAR), etc.
2.5 Quality of service (QoS)-based routing protocol
QoS-based routing protocol balances effective data delivery of the data to
the sink node with some predetermined QoS metrics [17, 20]. Some of the existing
QoS-based routing protocols are described below:
2.5.1 Sequential assignment outing (SAR) protocol
SAR protocol uses energy, QoS on each path, and the priority level of each
packet as the QoS metrics to achieve effective data delivery. SAR protocol discovers
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and uses multiple paths from the sink node to sensor nodes for effective data
delivery. SAR protocol considers energy efficiency and fault tolerance and also
focuses on minimizing the average weighted QoS metric during data transfer [21].
2.5.2 SPEED protocol
SPEED is also an example of QoS-based routing protocol. In SPEED, every
sensor node keeps its neighboring node information in order to increase the perfor-
mance of the protocol. For example, SPEED protocol has congestion avoidance
mechanism that is used to avoid congestion. The mechanism relies on the node
information. Routing module in SPEED is called stateless geographic nondeter-
ministic forwarding (SGNF) and works together with four modules at the network
layer. In this protocol, the total energy used for transmission is incomparable to
the performance of the routing algorithm.
2.5.3 QoS-aware and heterogeneously clustered routing (QHCR)
It is an energy-efficient routing protocol used by heterogeneous WSNs for delay-
sensitive, bandwidth-hungry, time-critical, and QoS-aware applications. The QHCR
protocol provides dedicated paths for real-time applications as well as delay-
sensitive applications at a lower energy. The QHCR protocol consists of information
gathering, cluster head selection, and intra-cluster communication phases.
2.6 Mobility-based routing protocol
Mobility-based routing protocol is a lightweight protocol that ensures data delivery
from source to destination nodes. Tree-based efficient data dissemination protocol
(TEDD), scalable energy-efficient asynchronous dissemination (SEAD), two-tier data
dissemination (TTDD), and data MULES are some of the examples of mobility-based
routing protocol. These routing protocols deal with the dynamism of the topology of
the network. The closest node to the sink node tends to transmit more than others,
which reduces its lifetime faster than other nodes [22]. Another example of the
mobility-based routing protocol was the protocol proposed by Kim et al. [23]. The
authors proposed a temperature-aware mobility algorithm for wireless sensor net-
works. Their algorithm employs store-and-carry mechanism to overcome the chal-
lenges posed by human postural mobility. In their store-and-carry-based routing
protocol, routing packets are stored in a temporary memory called buffer. The buffer
reroutes lost data to any intermediary node that temporarily lost connection with the
source node. Their protocol also uses temperature to determine the intermediary node.
Another example of mobility protocol is the routing protocol proposed by
Kumar et al. in [24]. They use ant colony optimization (ACO) and endocrine
cooperative particle swarm optimization (ECPSO) algorithms to enhance the per-
formance of the WSNs.
3. Security and privacy issues in WSN
Most of the existing WSN routing protocols and existing security solutions
are unsuitable for WSNs. This is due to resources constraint associated with
WSNs [25]. These constraints majorly determine the kind of security approaches
that can be adopted for WSNs. Various security issues and their solutions are
described in this section.
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3.1 Security and privacy issues
The increase in demand for a real-time information has made WSN become
more expedient. WSNs most of the time employs multi-hop transmission mode to
overcome their constraints. The major problem of multi-hop transmission is attacks
on the source data and nodes’ identities during hopping. For a resource-constraint
WSN with source node sending data to the destination through several intermedi-
ary nodes, there is a possibility of intrusion, identity tracing by an adversary,
gleaning, and modification of source data by the intermediary nodes. WSNs, most
times, operate in hostile environments and can be subjected to side channel attacks,
such as differential power analysis. In these attacks, the adversary monitors the
system, repeats the same operation, and takes careful measurements of power
consumed in a cycle-by-cycle basis in order to either recover the secret key or
perturb used in the perturbation. To prevent this, a scalar blinding is usually
engaged in cryptographic-based security solutions. The scalar multiplication is
blinded using integer m, where m is the order of the point P∈Eq, such that mP ¼ 0.
For example, instead of computing Q ¼ kP mod q, Q ¼ kþmð ÞP mod q is
computed.
Another issue in WSNs is how to preserve the identities of the source and
destination nodes from the privy of intermediary nodes and adversaries during
multi-hop. That is, there must be a form of lightweight authentication feature(s)
inherent in the data packet between a source and destination nodes. Some other
attacks on WSNs are discussed below.
3.1.1 Manipulating routing information
This attack targets the routing information between two sensor nodes. It can be
launched through spoofing or replaying the routing information. This can be done
by adversaries who have the capability of creating routing loops, attracting or
repelling network traffic, and extending or shortening source routes. This attack is a
passive attack which is not only easy to launch but elusive to detection. However, a
unique identity can be created for the selected path (using key-based hash function
of the pseudonyms or identity of all the selected intermediate nodes and embellishes
in the message, any attempt to record data packet from a location and re-tunnel it at
another location will be detected by the base station when comparing the
embellished path identity with hash of all the appended pseudonyms or identities of
all the nodes involved in the multi-hop).
3.1.2 Sybil attack
In this attack, adversary compromises the WSN by creating fake identities to
disrupt the network protocols. Sybil attack can lead to denial of services. It may also
affect mapping during routing, since a Sybil node creates illegal identities in a bid to
break down the one-to-one mapping between each node. Sybil is common in P2P
networks and also extends to wireless sensor networks [8]. Moreover, detection and
defense against Sybil attack is more challenging; this is due to the limited energy
and computational capabilities of WSNs. Different efforts had been developed to
thwart Sybil attack in WSN. An example is the use of a pair-wise key-based detec-
tion scheme which sets a threshold for the number of the identity that a node can
use [21]. However, this requires pre-assignment of keys to sensor node.
Another way to thwart Sybil attack is to validate identity of every node involved
in routing. This can be reactively or proactively done. Reactively means prior to
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routing, a node must provide enough identification parameters to differentiate it
from all other sensor nodes. The most common method is a resource test. Another
way is to increase the cost against the benefit in identity generation [8]. That is,
increasing cost of creating an identity and reducing the possible of having multiple
identities will thwart Sybil attack, since the goal of a Sybil attacker is to acquire
more identities. Also, traceable pseudonym and network-node identity generated
by base station can be used to prevent a Sybil attack [9, 26].
3.1.3 Sinkhole attack
This attack prevents the sink node (base station) from obtaining the complete
and correct data from the sensors, thus posing a threat to higher layer applications.
In this attack, an adversary makes itself receptively attractive to its neighboring
nodes in order to direct more traffics to itself [27, 28]. This results in adversary
attracting all the traffics that is meant for the sink node. The adversary can then
launch a more severe attack on the network, like selective forwarding, modifying,
or dropping the packets. WSN is more vulnerable to this attack because its nodes
most of the time send data to the base station [29].
Meanwhile, a point-to-point authentication between source node, identifiable
intermediate nodes, and end-to-end symmetric encryption between source and des-
tination nodes can be used prevent sinkhole, Sybil, and sinkhole attacks. The attack is
foiled once the adversary could not decrypt end-to-end symmetric encrypted data
even if it successfully impersonates the node and receives its data packet [9].
3.1.4 Clone attack
In a clone attack, the attacker first attacks and captures the legitimate sensor
nodes from the WSNs, collects all their information from their memories, copies
them on multiple sensor nodes to create clone nodes, and finally deploys them to
the network. Once a node is clone, adversary can then launch any other attacks.
There are two different ways of detecting this attack: centralized and distributed
approaches. Centralized uses sink node to detect and foil the activities of clone
nodes, while distributed approach uses selected nodes to detect clone nodes and foil
their activities in the network. Distributed approach is suitable for static WSNs
because distributed techniques use nodes’ location information to detect clones and
sensor nodes with the same identity, but different addresses are taken as clone
nodes. Meanwhile, in mobile WSNs, it is a different thing entirely, sensor nodes
keep changing their position, and these nodes keep joining and leaving the network.
Hence, node location information is not considered as the best technique for
detecting clone nodes. Clone node can launch the following attacks:
3.1.4.1 Selective forwarding attack
Multi-hop-based WSN routing protocols assumed that all the neighboring nodes
must re-hop their received data packets. Malicious nodes selectively forward some
packets while dropping the others. Selective forwarding attacks are most effective
when the adversary is actively involved in the data flow.
3.1.4.2 HELLO flood attack
This attack utilizes the connection between nodes. Most routing protocols
require sensor nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce themselves to their
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neighboring nodes. An adversary may exploit this to deceive sensor nodes
receiving the HELLO packet that they are within the radio range of the source node.
In [30], the authors proposed a new method for detecting the HELLO flood attack
based on distance. Here, nodes not only compare the RSS of the received HELLO
packet but also compare the node’s distance to the selected cluster head (CH)
with the threshold distance. Only those nodes whose RSS as well as distance falls
within the threshold limits are allowed to join the network. For example, in the
setup phase of LEACH protocol [31], CH sends its own location coordinates.
The nodes receiving HELLO packets from CH calculate the distance Dist as
shown below:
Dist ¼ sqrt sq x2 x1ð Þ þ sq y2 y1ð Þ½ 
Here, (x1; y1) are the coordinates of the sensor node receiving the packet, and
(x2; y2) are the coordinates of CH. Each sensor node calculate the radio signal
strength value (RSS) and distance between (Dist). These are used to determine the
cluster they belong in, that is, if RSS<ThRSS and Dist<ThDistð Þ then Node ¼
‘Friend of the cluster’ otherwise not a friend of the cluster.
3.1.4.3 Denial of service attack
This type of attack exploits the weaknesses in the sensor network, by attempting
to disrupt the sensor network. Denial of service (DoS) attack denies services to valid
users [32]. In a safety-critical network, this kind of attack can be disastrous to the
functionality of the network. One of the methods engaged by adversary to launch
DoS is by flooding the network with messages in order to increase traffics on the
network. The DOS attack can be detected through proper filtration of incoming
messages based on the contents and identifying nodes with high number of faulty
messages. Faulty messages are detected by checking for the contradiction between
messages sent by neighboring nodes [33].
3.2 Security and privacy solutions
Recently, application of WSN has gained massive attention leading to new
security challenges and design issues [34]. In this section, we discussed relevant
research efforts on the development of security schemes for WSN using different
approaches such as effective key management, public key infrastructure (PKI),
multiclass nodes, as well as grouping of nodes to improve the security of routing
protocols in WSNs.
3.2.1 Use of effective key management
Du et al. presented a scheme with an example of an effective key management.
Their scheme takes advantage of the high-end sensors in the heterogeneous net-
works. The performance evaluation and security analysis of their scheme show that
the key management scheme provides better security with less complexity than the
existing key management schemes [35]. The protocol pre-assigns a few keys in the
L-sensor and a few keys to every H-sensor. This is because H-sensor is tamper-proof
and has a larger memory than L-sensor. Their scheme uses asymmetric pre-
distribution (AP) key management scheme since the number of pre-distributed
keys in an H-sensor and in an L-sensor is different [12].
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3.2.2 Use of effective public key infrastructure
Yu in [36] solved the security problem in WSN using the public key cryptogra-
phy as a tool to ensure the authenticity of the sink node or base station. The
approach consists of two phases; the first phase is node to sink handshake phase,
where sink and sensor nodes set up session keys for secure data exchange. In the
second phase, the session keys are used to encrypt data. Their scheme is very easy to
implement, and requires a low computational power. The only limitation of their
scheme is that all the participating nodes in the network have to agree on a common
key prior to the exchange of data. However, any scheme based on a single key is
vulnerable to the key compromise. That is, a compromised sensor node will not only
compromise the shared key but also the whole network.
Also, Chen et al. [37] presented a PKI-based approach to ensure secure keys
exchange in the WSNs. Their scheme provides key management mechanism for
wireless sensor network applications that can handle sink mobility and deliver data
to neighboring nodes and sinks without failure. They also presented a method for
detecting and thwarting DoS attack and data authentication encryption.
3.2.3 Effective use of multiclass nodes
Du et al. [38] presents a new secure routing protocol for heterogeneous sensor
networks (HSNs), which is a two-tier secure routing (TTSR) protocol. The TTSR
protocol consists of both intra-cluster routing and inter-cluster routing schemes.
The intra-cluster routing forms a minimum spanning tree (shortest path tree)
among L-sensors in a cluster for data forwarding. In case of inter-cluster routing,
data packets are sent by H-sensors in the relay cells along the direction from the
source node to the sink node. The tree-based routing and relay via relay cells
of TTSR make it resistant to spoofing, selective forwarding, and sinkhole and
wormhole attacks.
Du [39] also proposed a novel QoS routing protocol that includes bandwidth
calculation and slot reservation for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS). Their QoS
routing protocol takes advantage of the numerous transmission ability of multi-
class nodes. Their protocol used three encryption keys:
1.A public key known by the sink and all other nodes
2.Node private key shared by two neighbor nodes and refreshed in the route
discovery phase
3.A share primary key between node and sink node
The QoS routing protocol divides transmission data into different data slices.
Each slice is route through a unique route of the discovered multipath.
3.2.4 Effective grouping of nodes to improve security of wireless sensor networks
In group-based WSN security scheme, the dominating node processes the sensed
information locally and prepares the authenticated report for the destination node
[40]. In this category, sensor nodes are grouped into smaller clusters wherein each
cell assigns a special sensor node to carry out all the burden of relaying multi-hop
packets. Hence division of labor is possible in the network, which makes the scheme
to consume low power. Zhang et al. in [41] presented a group-based security
10
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scheme for distributed wireless sensor networks; their scheme involves three
entities: one or more sink nodes, Y number of group dominator nodes, and
N number of ordinary sensor nodes.
3.2.5 Point-to-point security solution
Point-to-point security solution involves secure routing between every two
nodes along the multi-hop path. To show the design and efficacy of point-to-point
solution, we fully describe a typical point to point security solution for multi-hop
based WSNs proposed in [9]. Olakanmi and Dada [9] proposed an effective point-
to-point security scheme that engages point-to-point (PoP) mutual authentication
scheme, perturbation, and pseudonym to overcome security and privacy issues in
WSNs. To reduce computational cost and energy consumption, they used elliptic
curve cryptography, hash function, and exclusive OR operations to evolve an
efficient security solution for a decentralized WSNs. The network model, as
shown in Figure 3, consists of base station (BS), immediate node (IN), source
node (SN) or (sn), and destination node (DS) or (ds). The SNs and DSs are
capable of multi-hop transmission; therefore any SN can become DS and vice
versa.
The PoP security scheme consists of the following phases: registration and key
management, secure data exchange, perturbs generation, signature and obfusca-
tion, authentication, and verification and decryption phases.
3.2.5.1 Registration and key management phase
The serial number ψ of each node is sent to BS. BS then generates unique
pseudonym and network-node identity as follows:
i. BS randomly generates s, ρ∈Z ∗q ∗ , as its master secret key pair, and
computes and distributes its public parameter φ = (ρ + μ)P mod q, where P
is the generator of elliptic curve Eq and q is the order of E.
Figure 3.
Wireless sensor network system model.
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ii. Each node i randomly selects a unique ri ∈Z
∗
q , computes its two-way
distribution parameter βi as βi = (ri + μ)P mod q, and broadcasts its βi to
other nodes in the network.
iii. BS then computes Ni as Ni ¼ H ρ⊕ψ ið Þ and pseudonym Fi for each
registered node as Fi ¼ H Nikskψ ið Þ. It extracts the distribution parameter βi
of the node i in order to compute its node-base station shared key γbs!i as
γbs!i = ρ βi and sends the symmetrically encrypted node’s Fi and Ni as Eγbs!i
(Fi) to node i.
iv. On the receipt of its encrypted pseudonym, each node then generates its
corresponding node-base station shared key as γi ! bs = riφ and uses it to
decrypt the received encrypted pseudonym.
3.2.5.2 Secure data exchange phase
To send data M, the primary SN signs M and generates perturb to secure M. It
then encrypts the obfuscated message packet as σ, using its node-destination shared
key ϕsn!ds. The message packet σ contains the signature δ, perturbed data Pp,
pseudonyms of the primary source node Fsn, and destination node Fds.
3.2.5.3 Perturb generation phase
The perturbation enforces first level of security on the data. It is used to remove
semantic pattern caused by wide variation in the transmitted data. The perturbation
uses a novel additive noise generation method to perturb the data M. Primary
source and destination nodes independently generate a set of perturb λ for session τ
as follows:
i. The SN and its destination node generate their perturbation parameters αsn,
αds by randomly selecting a unique m1 ∈Z
∗
q and m2 ∈Z
∗
q , and compute
αsn ¼ m1 þ μð ÞP mod q and αds ¼ m2 þ μð ÞPmod q, respectively.
ii. Using the destination perturbation parameter αds for session, SN computes
perturbation seed ϑ as ϑ ¼ m1αds.
iii. For session, SN generates the perturbation chain as λ ¼ λ1, λ2, λ3 … λkf g,
where λ1 = Hϑ(ϑ|| Fsn), λn = Hϑ(λ(n  1)) for n ¼ 2… k. Clear all the
perturbation parameters of perturb index n 1 in its memory for session τ
and destination node of pseudonym Fds. It replaces its former encrypted
perturbation parameters with the new one, that is, replaces [(λn  1||m1||
n  1||Fds) ⊕ ϑ] with [(λn||m1||n||Fds)⊕ ϑ].
iv. Primary SN computes new perturb for every new data transmission of the
same session by repeating step c using the previously used perturb λn1.
However, for a new session and destination node, SN generates a new ϑ by
following steps (i)-(iii).
3.2.5.4 Signature and perturbation phase
Primary source node signs and perturbs the data packet through the following
process:
12
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a. Both the SN and destination nodes compute the source-destination shared
session key ϕsn ! ds as follows:
i. SN and destination nodes uniquely generate κ1 and κ2, respectively.
ii. SN extracts the two-way distribution parameter of destination node
βds to compute ϕsn ! ds as ϕsn ! ds = κ1βds.
b. Sign its data M using its source-destination shared session key ϕsn ! ds as
δ = H ϕsn ! ds (M), perturbs M as Pp =M + λn.
c. SN finally generates its message packet as σ = δ||Pp||Fi||Fj||n, and encrypts it as
σσ = σ ⊕ ϕsn ! ds to further ensure second-tier data confidentiality and
integrity of the message and communication information, where Fi and Fj are
the pseudonyms of the source and destination nodes, respectively.
d. SN then performs PoP authentication with its IN, as described in the next
section, before hopping Pp to the IN.
3.2.5.5 Authentication phase
After the signature and perturbation phase, the source node initiates the PoP
authentication with the IN as follows:
i. SN generates an authentication token ω and time stamp ts.
ii. SN and IN randomly generate υ ∈ Z ∗q and ε ∈ Z
∗
q , respectively. SN
computes its PoP authentication parameter as nsn = (υ + μ)P mod q, while IN
computes its own as nin = (ε + μ)P mod q and sends it to SN, who then
computes its PoP session authentication key φsn ! in as φsn ! in = υ.nin.
iii. SN then encrypts the concatenated authentication token ω, pseudonym of
source, pseudonym of IN, and time stamp as Eφsn ! in (ω||Fsn||Fin||ts),
concatenates it with nsn as Eφsn ! in(ω||Fsn||Fin||ts))||nsn, and sends it to its IN.
iv. On the receipt of Eφsn ! in(ω ||Fsn||Fin||ts)||nsn, IN extracts nsn then computes
its φ in!sn = ε.nsn. It decrypts the received Eφsn ! in(ω||Fsn||Fin||ts) using its
φsn ! in to extract ω and ts. It, thereafter, re-encrypts the extracted ω and ts,
using φin ! sn, and sends it back to the SN. The SN decrypts it using its
φsn ! in and verifies it by comparing the ω and ts with their original values.
If equal, SN hops its encrypted data packet σσ. The IN then becomes
temporary SN and repeats this phase with its selected IN until the packet
gets to the destination node.t
3.2.5.6 Verification and decryption
Destination node extracts and authenticates the received data M by following
this procedure:
i. Destination node extracts the two-way distribution parameter of SN and
βsn and computes destination of the used perturb P.
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ii. Destination node regenerates the used perturb λ0n by checking the value on
the perturb index n. If n = 1, it indicates that the source is new to the
destination node, and destination node then executes perturbation
generation phase in order to obtain the perturb seed, which would be used
to recompute the used perturb. However, if n > 1, it indicates that the
session is for old destination node. The destination node retrieves the
encrypted last perturb for the source node from its memory, decrypts it,
and uses it to obtain the used perturb by executing step 3 of the
perturbation generation phase. Extract the n message by unperturb PP as:
M0 = PP  λ
0
n.
iii. Destination node verifies the signature by re-signing the unblinded
messageM0 using its ϕds ! sn as δ
0 = Hϕds ! sn (M
0). If δ0 = δ, then the
perturb, data, and the source node are all valid, and destination node then
accepts the data, otherwise rejects the data. Encrypt the perturbation
parameter as λn ⊕ ϑ, m2 ⊕ ϑ, n ⊕ ϑ, Fsn. Clear all the previously
encrypted perturbation parameters stored for Fsn in its memory, and
replace it (λn||ϑ||m2||ϑ||n).
4. Conclusion
This chapter shows overview of wireless sensor networks with its security and
privacy framework. The chapter proffers to readers an in-depth understanding of
security and privacy issues as related to WSNs. Some existing research in WSN
routing protocols are discussed. This chapter also helps researchers to understand
the current trends in WSNs routing protocols and security schemes.
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